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CASE COMMENTS
CONTRIBUTION: LIMITATION ON THE LIABILITY
OF ONE TORTFEASOR*
A train and a truck are involved in a collision in which a brake-
man on the train is killed. The railroad settles for $42,5oo an action
brought against it under the Federal Employers' Liability Act by the
administrator for the brakeman. The railroad then sues the truck own-
er, whose liability for the wrongful death is based on a state wrong-
ful death statute under which the maximum recovery is limited
to $17,500. Is the railroad entitled to recover and, if so, what is to be
the amount of the recovery?
This was the knotty problem presented in Northern Pac. Ry. v.
Zontelli Bros., Inc.1 The decedent's administratrix decided to sue the
railway under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. In due course
Zontelli Brothers was made a third party defendant by order of the
court. The railway settled with the widow of the brakeman for
$42,50o and instituted an action for contribution against Zontelli
Brothers. The jury in this last action found that the railway and
the truck company were both negligent and rendered a verdict for
$21,500 in favor of the railway. The maximum recovery which the
administratix could have obtained under the Minnesota Wrongful
Death Act if she had sued Zontelli directly was $17,500.2
The underlying premise on which contribution among joint
tortfeasors is based is the compensation of one who has discharged
a debt for which several are liable.3 This compensation may be ex-
plained either on a quasi-contractual obligation on the part of each
*Ed. Note: The following case comment discusses the decision of the district
court in Northern Pac. Ry. v. Zontelli Bros., Inc., 161 F. Supp. 769 (D. Minn. 1958).
After this comment was written, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed
the decision in Zontelli Bros., Inc. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 45 A.B.A.J. 287 (8th Cir.
Jan. 26, 1959). In affirming the decision of the district court, the court of appeals
reformed the judgment below by holding that the maximum contribution available
from Zontelli Brothers was $17,500, the limitation placed by the wrongful death
act of Minnesota on Zontelli's liability.
1161 F. Supp. 769 (D. Minn. 1958).
237 Minn. Stat. Ann. § 573.02 which reads: "Subdivision i .... The recovery in
such action in such an amount as the jury deems fair and just in reference to the pe-
cuniary loss resulting from such death, shall not exceed $17,5oo and shall be for the
exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse and next of kin proportionate to the pecuni-
ary loss severally suffered by the death." The limit on recovery has since been raised
to $25,ooo. Laws of Minn. 1957, ch. 712, § 573.02.
Parten v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 204 Minn. 200, 283 N.W. 4o8, 412
(1938); Brown v. Hargraves, 198 Va. 748, 96 S.E.2d 788, 791 (1957); Wait v. Pierce,
191 WiS. 202, 226, 21o N.W. 822, 823 (1926).
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to help bear the common burden, 4 or on an equitable principle of
equality in sharing the common burden and preventing unjust en-
richment after another tortfeasor has paid the entire debt.5
At common law there was no right to contribution among joint
tortfeasors. The law left the parties where it found them on the theory
that one should not be permitted to bring an action based on one's
own wrong.6 However, because of vigorous denunciation of this com-
mon law principle by writers, many jurisdictions, either by statute or
judicial decision, now permit contribution among joint tortfeasors.7
In order for a right of contribution to exist there must have been
common liability from joint tortfeasors to the original plaintiff.8
"Contribution of any sort presupposes a common burden or
incubus resting upon all members of a group, more than his
share of which one of such members has discharged for the ben-
efit of all. It is an equitable device to redistribute the common
burden rateably and in a fashion different from that employed
by the person to whom each one of the group is usually answer-
able severally for the entire amount. In cases of contract con-
tribution it is ordinarily quite easy to determine the amount
of the common obligation .... But this is not true of the com-
mon obligation in tort contribution."9
It is generally held that the mere existence of concurring negligence
by joint tortfeasors is not the test which must be applied.10 Common
liability does not mean that contribution between concurrent tort-
'Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 77 A.2d 368 (1951); Proff v. Maley,
14 Wash. 2d 287, 128 P.2d 330 (1942).
5Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Rosenthal, 14 N.J. 372, io2 A.gd 587,
593, 595 (1954).
"Warner v. Capital Transit Co., 162 F. Supp. 253, 255 (1958); Prosser, Torts 246-
49 (2d ed. 1955)-
7Prosser, Torts '248-49 (2d ed. 1955); Gregory, Contribution Among Tortfeasors;
A Uniform Practice, 1938 Wis. L. Rev. 365; Note, 32 Colum. L. Rev. 94 (1932);
Note, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 349 (1931).
'Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.ad 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949); George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital
Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Chapman v. Lamar-Rankin Drug Co.,
13 S.E.2d 734 (Ga. App. 1941); Zutter v. O'Connell, 2oo Wis. 60, 229 N.W. 74 (193o);
See also: Puller v. Puller, 38o Pa. 219, 11O A.2d 175 (1955); Fisher v. Diehl, 156 Pa.
Super. 476, 4o A.2d 912 (1945). i-hen the Pennsylvania court points out that al-
though a wife may not sue her husband for personal injuries, this does not prevent
one who is jointly liable with a husband for injuries suffered by the wife from ob-
taining contribution from the husband. Pennsylvania follows the theory that as be-
tween two tortfeasors the contribution is not a recovery for the tort but the enforce-
ment of an equitable duty to share liability for the wrong done.
9Gregory, Contribution Among Tortfeasors: A Uniform Practice, 1938 Wis. L.
Rev. 365, 369.
"Yellow Cab Co. v. Dreslin, 181 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 195o); Leflar, Contribution
and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 13o, 131 & n.9 (1932).
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feasors can be enforced only if both are judgment debtors of the
plaintiff." However, when the liability is joint and several, though
the acts of the negligent parties were independent and concurrent,
there is common liability1 2 unless the tortfeasor from whom contri-
bution is sought could not have been sued because of a marital, filial,
or other family relationship, or unless there was an assumption of the
risk by the plaintiff as far as this defendant was concerned.13 In either
of the latter cases there would be no liability, common or other-
wise.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina held in Wilson v. Mas-
sagee,14 a 1944 decision, that there was no common liability to support
contribution where the liability of one of the joint tortfeasors was
based on a state wrongful death act and the other tortfeasor's liability
arose under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Wilson, an em-
ployee of the Southern Railway Company, was killed when a truck
owned by the Sinclair Refining Company and driven by Massagee
collided with a Southern train. Mrs. Wilson sued Massagee and Sin-
clair Refining under the North Carolina Wrongful Death Act. By mo-
tion defendant Massagee sought to join Southern Railway as a third
party defendant on the theory that Massagee would be entitled to
contribution from Southern Railway if it were shown during the
course of the trial that Massagee and the railway both were liable
to the plaintiff. Southern Railway appeared specially, moving the
court to strike the order joining it as a party defendant and to dis-
miss the action as to it. The court granted the railway's motion on
the ground that since the action against the truck driver [Massagee]
was based on the North Carolina -Wrongful Death Act, whereas the
action against Southern Railway was based on the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, there was no common liability among the alleged joint
tortfeasors so as to support contribution.
"Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949); George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital
Transit Co., 126 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1942). There are, however, eight states (New
York, Delaware, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Texas and West
Virginia) which have statutes applying only to contribution between defendants
against whom there is a joint judgment. Smith and Prosser, Cases and Materials on
Torts 463 (2d ed. 1957). See Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act § 1(a):
"Except as otherwise provided in this Act, where two or more persons become jointly
or severally liable in tort ... for the same wrongful death; there is a right of con-
tribution among them even though judgment has not been recovered against all or
any of them."
1-George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., supra note ii; Piratensky v.
Wallach, 162 Misc. 749, 295 N.Y. Supp. 581 (N.Y. City Ct. 1935).
u3Yellow Cab Co. v. Dreslin, supra note to; Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 1003 (1951). See
note 8 supra.
"224 N.C. 705, 32 S.E.2d 335 (1944).
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As between two states, it is generally held that a judgment for
damages for the wrongful death of a person is a bar to an action under
a statute of another jurisdiction or in another state to recover for
the same death where the real party in interest is the same, even
though the nominal parties are different.15 Under this view, therefore,
one joint tortfeasor would-be entitled to contribution from another
joint tortfeasor, since payments by the first tortfeasor would relieve the
second from his liability. On analogy this result would seem to follow
as between one state and the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
In the Wilson case, the North Carolina court held that there was
no common liability to support contribution since the beneficiary
under the Wrongful Death Act16 was not the same as the beneficiary
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. But the principal case is
to be distinguished from Wilson on this point: the surviving wife is
beneficiary under both the Federal Employers' Liability Act and the
Minnesota Wrongful Death Act.' 7 Payment by one joint tortfeasor
under one of these acts would relieve the other joint tortfeasor of his
liability under the other act. Hence, there seems to be common lia-
bility in the principal case so as to support contribution, the Min-
nesota court having specifically found the railway and Zontelli to be
jointly and severally liable to the surviving widow.' 8
Since Minnesota is one of six states to adopt contribution without
2Chicago, RJ. & Pac. Ry. v. Schendel, 270 U.S. 611 (1926); Teixeira v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 261 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1958); McCarron v. New York Cent. R.R.,
239 Mass. 64, 131 N.E. 478 (1921); See Luce v. New York, Chicago and St. L.R.R.,
242 N.Y. 518,• 152 N.E. 409 (1926).
IhN.C. Gen. Stat. § 28-173 (1950); See also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28-149 (1950), which
provides "the surplus of the estate, in case of intestacy, shall be distributed in
the following manner, except as hereinafter provided: i. If a married man die
intestate leaving one child and a wife, the estate shall be equally distributed be-
tween the child and wife; ... 2. If there is more than one child, the widow shall
share equally with all the children and be entitled to a child's part; ... S. If
there is no child nor legal representative of a deceased child, then one-half the
estate shall be allotted to the widow, and the residue be distributed equally to every
of the next of kin of the intestate...."
"Federal Employers' Liability Act, § 1, 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1952):
"[E]very common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of
the several states or territories ... shall be liable in damages to any person suffering
injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or, in case of the death
of such employee, to-his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the sur-
viving widow or husband and children of such employee...." 37 Minn. Stat. Ann. §
573.02 states: "The recovery in such action ... shall be for the exclusive benefit
of the surviving spouse and next of kin proportionate to the pecuniary loss severally
suffered by the death."
1s61 F. Supp. at 771, 772.
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a statute,19 the court in the principal case held that the wrongful
death act will not be construed as defeating the common law right
to contribution, and thus the railroad was permitted to receive one-half
its settlement from Zontelli through contribution. It is submitted,
however, that the recovery limitation imposed by the Minnesota
Wrongful Death Act could be enforced without defeating the sup-
posed common law right of contribution. Contribution "hinges on the
doctrine that general principles of justice require that in the case
of a common obligation, the discharge of it by one of the obligors,
without proportionate payment from the other, gives the latter an
advantage to which he is not equitably entitled."
20
What should be the aliquot portion which Zontelli ought to pay
or bear in the principal case? In suretyship, contribution is propor-
tionate to the interest held or the liability undertaken. 2' Applying
the suretyship theory to the case in comment, Zontelli's liability should
be limited to $17,5oo since that is the maximum for which he would
have been liable under the Minnesota Wrongful Death Act; the rail-
way's liability should be limited to $42,500, which is the total amount
of the debt due. The railway and Zontelli would therefore be "sure-
ties" to the extent of $6oooo on a $42,50o debt. Zontelli, in view of
the obligation undertaken under the death act, would be liable to the
railway for $12,395.83 under this suretyship theory.22
Basing contribution on an equitable principle of equality aimed
at preventing unjust enrichment, Zontelli could not have been en-
riched more than the amount for which he could have been liable
"The only states to adopt contribution without a statute are Pennsylvania,
Louisiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. Smith and Prosser, Cases
and Materials on Torts 461 (2d ed. 1957).
OGeorge's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
1Southern Surety Co. v. Commercial Cas. Ins., 31 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1929),
cert. denied, 28o U.S. 577 (1929); United States Fid. and Guar. Co. v. Naylor,




death debt due as a
times result of the amount owed
total limit on liability settlement by Zontelli
of Zontelli and
the railroad
In figures, this formula produces the amount of the settlement [$42,5oo] which is
attributable to Zontelli:
17,500
times $42,500 equals $12,395.83(17,5oo) plus (42,5oo)
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to deceased's representative before the railway paid the debt.23 Under
the Minnesota Wrongful Death Act, Zontelli's total liability would
be limited to $17,500 if he were a sole tortfeasor. However, where
there are two joint tortfeasors and the death results from their con-
curring negligence, the remedy of contribution is available.24 A paying
defendant whose liability is fixed by the wrongful death act would be
entitled to one-half of the amount paid in settlement.25 In the case
in comment that amount would be limited to $8,75o.
Since the court found that Zontelli was relieved of an obligation
to the administratrix, he was unjustly enriched to that extent. Aside
from considerations of contribution, his unjust enrichment must be
limited to $17,500 since that is the maximum amount he would have
been liable for had he been sued directly. The only explanation for
the result of the court in the principal case seems to be an application
of a comparative negligence doctrine.26 The court is treating the
acion as a tort suit rather than as an action for contribution. Since
the jury found that the railway and Zontelli were equally negligent,
="Contribution is an equitable principle of equality in the sharing of a com-
mon burden arising out of contract or status, to enforce restitution and prevent
unjust enrichment, that at common law does not extend to persons in equal or
mutual fault. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Rosenthal, 14 N.J. 372, 102
A.2d 587, 593 (1954). See also Phillips-Jones Corp. v. Parmley, 302 US. 233, 236
(1937)- Mr. Justice Brandeis speaking for the court said: "The right to sue for
contribution does not depend upon a prior determination that the defendants are
liable. Whether they are liable is the matter to be decided in the suit. To recover,
a plaintiff must prove that there was a common burden of debt and that he has, as
between himself and the defendants, paid more than his fair share of the common
obligations."
"The basic theory upon which contribution is permitted is that the party from
whom contribution is sought must have been relieved of a debt or obligation and
accordingly should be required to reimburse the person who paid, thereby relieving
him from such debt or obligation. Merrimac Mining Co. v. Gross, 216 Minn. 244,
12 N.W.2d 506 (1943). See also American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Molling, 239 Minn.
74, 57 N.W.2d 847 ('953)-
mjf an action had been brought under the Minnesota Wrongful Death Act
against Zontelii arising out of the death of plaintiff's intestate, and Zontelli had
sought contribution from the railroad, the railroad's maximum liability would
have been $8,75o. See Wold v. Grozalsky, 277 N.Y. 364, 14 N.E.Rd 437 (1938) for
apportionment of contribution in certain cases.
-w'Under the new English Statute, the Canadian Statutes and the Maritime Con-
ventions Act, however, contribution is apportioned among the tortfeasors in ac-
cordance with their respective degrees of fault .... This feature is in keeping with
an analogous trend in Anglo-American law to qualify the harshness of the defense of
contributory negligence by merely cutting down a negligent plaintiff's recovery of
damages in accordance with his respective degrees of fault." Gregory, Contribution
Among Tortfeasors: A Uniform Pfactice, 1938 Wis. L. Rev. 365, 372, 373. The court
in the principal case found the truck company and the railroad equally negligent so
the recovery by the plaintiff was borne equally by each of them.
